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It is shown that the effect of transmission loss has often not been properly taken into account in
the security proofs on quantum key distribution. A class of general attacks to be called probabilistic
re-sends attack is described that has not been accounted for, which is a generalization of the well-
known unique state determination attack. In the case of the four-state single-photon BB84 protocol,
it is shown in detail how such attacks are not accounted for in the known security proofs against
the simplest individual attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real optical systems have significant loss from the
transmitted signal to the detected signal. If the trans-
mission loss is small one can treat the deleted bits as
random errors and deal with them by an error correcting
code. Security claim, however, has often been made with
arbitray loss taken into account just on the throughput
via post-detection selection of the detected bits. That it
is clearly not a valid inference could be seen from the sit-
uation of the two-state B92, for which security is totally
breached in an intercept-resend attack when the loss is
above a certain threshold determined by the two signal
states [1]. Such attack can be generalized to any BB84
type protocols involving any number of coherent states,
which are necessarily linearly independent and hence al-
lows such ”zero error” attack in the presence of suffi-
cient loss [2]. These general attacks have been called
unique state determination (USD) attacks, and they are
identical to attacks with probabilistic exact cloning [3].
For the four-state BB84, the optimal individual attack
is the same as an approximate cloning attack. Prob-
abilistic approximate cloning may, however, sometimes
lead to better performance than approximate cloning it-
self [4]. Thus, the attacker Eve could launch attacks by
probabilistic approximate cloning, and not just on single
qubits (or the boson modes they embed in to be called
”qumodes”) but segments of qubits with entanglement
or perhaps the whole key sequence. In this paper, such
attack is further generalized to what will be called prob-
abilistic re-send (PRS) attack, which has not been ac-
counted for in the security proofs of lossy system thus
far. In the case of individual attacks on the four- and
six-state BB84 protocol with transmission loss, a general
attack formulation is possible that include all attacks. It
will be shown in the four-state case that there are in-
deed attacks lying outside the ones treated without loss
or with loss and just throughput reduction.
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II. INCOMPLETENESS OF MERE
POST-DETECTION SELECTION
The argument is often made that all the losses in the
cryptosystem could just be lumped together by a loss pa-
rameter which affects the rate of final key bits that can
be generated but not the key security. In [5, p.336] it is
stated explicitly that ”Detector inefficiencies and other
types of losses can be incorporated into the Shor-Preskill
security analysis easily enough. Through public discus-
sion, Alice and Bob can eliminate from their sifted key
all signals for which Bob failed to record a measurement
result”. In [6] only detector loss is represented with no
transmission loss, presumably for the same reason since
the results are applied to the NEC cryptosystem [7,8] to
operate with significant transmission loss. Although the
four BB84 states are not linearly independent so that
USD attack does not apply directly, a proof is needed to
show why Eve cannot take advantage of the transmission
loss and do better. In general, the following PRS attack
needs to be fully accounted for.
Transmission loss and detector loss are very different.
Assuming as we do that Bob’s detector loss cannot be
controlled by Eve, detector loss would delete the incom-
ing qubits randomly independently of what Eve has done
to them. On the other hand, for transmission loss Eve
could intercept and then resend only those she chooses.
She may or may not have the ability to replace the lossy
transmission line with a lossless one. In [1-2] it was as-
sumed she does have the capability which makes it easy
to see what she may do to her advantage. Even if she
does not, her attack capability is still enlarged as we will
show mathematically in the case of individual attacks in
Appendix A. When she has the loss replacement capa-
bility which is usually granted, we see that transmission
loss becomes very different from detector loss since each
of the incoming signal before detection has now been se-
lected by Eve, which may raise her performance by an
amount that has to be determined as a function of the
transmission loss parameter 1 − η, where η is the trans-
mittance of the line.
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FIG. 1: Schematic way to eliminate or reduce the effect of
loss by user: loss is alleviated or eliminated with favorable
pre-detection outcome.
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FIG. 2: Schematic way to take advantage of loss by attacker:
a more favorable input state ρf from Eve’s viewpoint is sought
with possible quantum signal detection (PRS attack).
III. PROBABILISTIC RE-SEND (PRS) ATTACK
Generally, the users may try to combat loss by pre-
detection as indicated in Fig. 1, with success probabil-
ity itself limited by η. Examples include quantum non-
demolition (QND) measurement (but see [9] on the in-
appropriate terminology) and herald qubit amplifier [10].
Eve has a similar attack approach, the probabilistic re-
send attack as indicated in Fig.2. Sufficient loss would
allow her to cover the deleted bits in various possible
ways. The class of PRS attack evidently includes prob-
abilistic approximate cloning. Note that this possibility
of bit deletion from transmission loss violates the usual
information-disturbance tradeoff that underlines QKD
security of the BB84 and Ekert types which need to em-
ploy intrusion level estimation, in that information can be
gained by Eve without causing any relevant disturbance.
While PRS attacks can be covered in a sufficiently
general formulation on Eve’s probe formation, it is not
automatically covered by mere post-detection selection
as explained above, and also not by the use of squash-
ing [11,12] or heralded qubit amplifier [10]. Specifically,
squashing or QND measurement could reduce an infinite
dimensional qumode to three levels, qubit plus vacuum
state. Post-detection selection gets rid of the vacuum
state. Heralded qubit amplifier is a pre-detection scheme
of Fig. 1 that acts for entangled pairs what QND mea-
surement does for single photons. The question remains
that transmission loss may have already allowed Eve’s to
use PRS attack of Fig. 2 that gives her better or much
better performance than a security analysis which ne-
glects such attacks would show. Even when line replace-
ment is not possible for Eve to make up the loss from her
bit deletion, she could use PRS attacks on some fraction
of the qubits allowed by the loss, which are not accounted
for by mere post-detection selection. In fact, there are
more attack possibilities even if line replacement is not
allowed, as shown in Appendix A.
IV. CONCLUSION
Significant loss cannot be avoided in optical signal
transmissions. Thus, any practical application of QKD
must deal with the loss induced security issues. A small
amount is already known [13] to cause huge security prob-
lem when the photon detection mechanism is exploited
in the detector ”blinding attacks”. In this paper we have
shown a whole class of PRS attacks have not been ac-
counted for in existing security analysis, not even for
individual attacks when Eve cannot replace the trans-
mission loss. Until all attacks allowed by the laws of
quantum physics are taken into account, a security proof
cannot be said to provide ”unconditional security” even
if the analysis is entirely valid.
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Appendix A: Identical individual attacks (IIA) on
lossy single-photon BB84
This appendix is derrived from a 2008 internal memo
by R. Nair and H.P. Yuen.
3We now demonstrate that even without replacing the
lossy line by a lossless one, Eve may launch attacks not
covered by a lossless analysis with post-detection selec-
tion adjustment.
We make the following assumptions:
1. Alice’s state source is perfect and prepares one of
the four BB84 states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉),
or |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉) in the two-dimensional signal
space HA in the case of the 4-state protocol. In the
case of the 6-state ‘BB84’ protocol, the two states
|L〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+i|1〉) and |R〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉−i|1〉) are ad-
ditionally prepared. Note that, in this memo, HA
is simply an abstract two-dimensional Hilbert space
– the possibility of various implementations of this
space is left open. The most common one is that
of embedding HA in Hhoriz ⊗Hvert as the single-
photon subspace, with |0〉 ∈ HA corresponding to
|1〉horiz|0〉vert and |1〉 to |0〉horiz|1〉vert. Hhoriz andHvert are the respectively the infinite-dimensional
Fock spaces representing the horizontal and vertical
polarization modes of a field mode.
2. The received state of Bob (even in the presence
of Eve) is assumed to lie in a three-dimensional
Hilbert space HB = HA
⊕
span{|∅〉}. Here |∅〉 rep-
resents the ‘no-count’ state and is orthogonal toHA
– it is the vacuum state in the polarization imple-
mentation described above. In the absence of Eve,
the transmission medium between Alice and Bob is
represented by the following loss map:
ρ 7→ ηρ+ (1− η)|∅〉〈∅|, (1)
where ρ ∈ HA and the output state is in HB . In
other words, we assume (in the absence of Eve)
a loss channel with state-independent throughput
(i.e., transmittance) η. It may easily be verified
that such a loss channel results in the polarization
implementation when the horizontal and vertical
polarizations are subjected to independent linear
loss of magnitude 1− η.
3. Eve launches an identical individual attack (IIA).
In other words, her action can be represented by a
probe system HE in some initial state |E〉 and the
application of an isometry (i.e., inner-product pre-
serving transformation) T : HA ⊗HE → HB ⊗HE
on the signal + probe. This action is repeated with
identically prepared probes on each of the transmit-
ted signals.
4. For each of the signal states |ψin〉, Eve’s attack re-
sults in an effective ρout ∈ HB . We assume that
the throughput ηψin := 1−〈∅|ρout|∅〉 = η. In other
words, Eve’s action results in the same through-
put for each of the four/six signal states of the 4-
state/6-state protocol as would be seen if Eve was
absent. We do not make any assumption on the
throughput of the non-signal states.
5. Bob’s detectors are perfect – he is assumed to be
able to make without error and with unit success
probability the ideal measurement projecting onto
|∅〉 and any one of the two/three orthogonal bases
in the 4-state/6-state protocol.
Our assumptions above are conservative in the sense
that limiting Eve to IIA’s is a restriction on her capabil-
ity. The equal signal throughput condition 4 above is also
conservative since the BB84 protocol does not explicitly
include a check for uniformity of throughput across the
signal states. Even if it did, such a check would be hard
to implement. In practice, for single photon transmission
through optical fibers, the throughput of the signal states
may vary with time and may be polarization-dependent
even in the absence of Eve. Thus, we are indeed limit-
ing our study to a small class of attacks. On the other
hand, PRS attacks are included in the formulation when
lossless line replacement is not allowed. Unearthing new
attacks in this conservative scenario would suggest the
possibility of hitherto unstudied attacks under more gen-
eral conditions.
A.1 Characterization of Attack Isometry T
A general isometry T : HA ⊗HE → HB ⊗HE is spec-
ified (at least on inputs where HE is in the state |E〉) by
the right hand sides of the two equations:
T |0〉A|E〉E =
∑
i=0,1,∅
|i〉B |φ0i 〉E , (2)
and
T |1〉A|E〉E =
∑
i=0,1,∅
|i〉B |φ1i 〉E . (3)
The kets of the HE system are not normalized. The
condition that T be an isometry results in the following
conditions on the states |φbi 〉E :∑
i=0,1,∅
‖ φbi ‖2= 1 b = 0, 1, (4)
and ∑
i=0,1,∅
〈φ0i |φ1i 〉 = 0. (5)
The restriction imposed by our Assumption 4 is more
interesting. By using the linearity of T and the fact that
the loss (loss := 1 - throughput) 1− ηψ of an input state
|ψ〉A is given by the squared-norm of the state in HE
multiplying |∅〉B in T |ψ〉A|E〉E , one gets the following
general expression for the loss seen by any state |ψ〉A =
a|0〉A + b|1〉A:
1− ηψ = |a|2 ‖ φ0∅ ‖2 +|b|2 ‖ φ1∅ ‖2 +2Re[ab〈φ0∅|φ1∅〉]. (6)
4Let us impose Assumption 4 for the 4-state BB84 proto-
col. Using (6), the condition that η0 = η1 = η implies
that
‖ φ0∅ ‖2=‖ φ1∅ ‖2= 1− η. (7)
The restrictions that η+ = η− = η are both satisfied if
and only if
Re〈φ0∅|φ1∅〉 = 0. (8)
Interestingly, this condition actually implies that ηψ = η
for all |ψ〉A = a|0〉A + b|1〉A with a, b ∈ R, i.e., for all
states on the great circle of the Bloch sphere containing
the 4 BB84 states. In the case of the 6-state protocol,
we have the additional restrictions ηL = ηR = η. In this
case, we can show from (6) that we must have
〈φ0∅|φ1∅〉 = 0. (9)
Adding this last condition to the rest in fact implies that
ηψ = η for all |ψ〉A ∈ HA! To summarize, the conditions
(4), (5), (7), (8) must hold for both 4-state and 6-state
BB84 and (9) holds for 6-state BB84.
A.2 Filtering of No-Count Events
The isometry T studied above contains more informa-
tion than is necessary for a security analysis. Apart from
unitary freedoms in Eve’s actions and in choice of the
initial probe state, we have not yet considered the fol-
lowing filtering operation that Bob performs: When Bob
measures a particular signal system HB in the state |∅〉,
that system cannot be used for generating key and is dis-
carded. Thus, we imagine a two-valued projection mea-
surement by Bob consisting of the projection onto |∅〉
and the projection PA onto HA. In practice, Bob makes
a single three-valued measurement, but we may concep-
tually divide this into the step of making the above two-
valued measurement followed by measurement of one of
the BB84 bases. Since the protocol proceeds only on the
cases where Bob obtains a result in HA, we write the
post-selected output states corresponding to inputs |0〉A
and |1〉A:
PAT |0〉A|E〉E =
∑
i=0,1
|i〉B |φ0i 〉E , (10)
and
PAT |1〉A|E〉E =
∑
i=0,1
|i〉B |φ1i 〉E . (11)
We may re-normalize to norm 1 these states by dividing
by the throughput
√
η. If we define hatted (post-selected)
states |φˆbi 〉E = |φ
b
i 〉E√
η , we get the following conditions on
the hatted states from (4-5):
∑
i=0,1
‖ φˆbi ‖2= 1 b = 0, 1, (12)
and ∑
i=0,1
〈φˆ0i |φˆ1i 〉 = −〈φˆ0∅|φˆ1∅〉. (13)
For the 4-state BB84 protocol, the RHS of Eq. (13) is
a pure imaginary number because of (8):
〈φˆ0∅|φˆ1∅〉 = iX, (14)
with X ∈ R.
For the 6-state protocol, on the other hand, 〈φˆ0∅|φˆ1∅〉 =
0. It is then readily verified that the Eqs. (12) and (13)
are identical to the conditions that would result from Eve
applying an attack isometry S : HA ⊗HE → HA ⊗HE ,
which corresponds to an attack on the lossless case (this
may also be seen to result from Eqs. (2) and (3) by setting
the throughput η identically to 1).
The equations (10) and (11) along with conditions (12)
and (13) are the starting point for the security analysis in-
volving, for example, the calculation of the information-
disturbance tradeoff between Eve’s information and the
induced error rate [14]. From the above, we may con-
clude that under our assumptions, a fresh calculation of
this tradeoff is not necessary for the 6-state protocol as
it would yield exactly the same results. For the 4-state
protocol, on the other hand, the possibility of Eve induc-
ing a non-zero RHS in Eq. (13) opens up a new class of
identical individual attacks that have not been included
in the security analysis to date and provide an urgent
problem for the security of the protocol.
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